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Is Owning Stock an Abnormally Dangerous
Activity? Shareholder Limited Liability in
Tort
Daniel P. Schley, CFA
Academics have contested the merits of shareholder limited
liability for decades.1 As part of this discussion, some of limited
liability’s critics cite tort law to conclude that corporate law
erroneously shields shareholders from personal liability.2 They
contend that tort law would not so egregiously allow
shareholders to externalize costs onto tort victims who have no
control over the type of legal entity that injures them.3 But tort
law does not follow this logic. It does not examine the type of the
defendant merely to search for the deepest pockets to find
liability.4 Moreover, corporate officers and directors—not
shareholders—control the ability for the corporation to pay its
debts as they come due (corporate capitalization).5
Given these academic conclusions’ inconsistency with tort
law and corporate governance, this Article reconsiders whether
shareholders would benefit from limited liability in tort and finds
that tort law, like the current corporate law regime, would
uphold shareholder limited liability. Shareholders would not be
strictly liable for corporate torts. Rather, they would only be
liable to the extent they failed to use reasonable care. This
Article reaches this conclusion by examining a well-known Judge
Richard Posner decision which emphasized that strict liability for
abnormally dangerous activities is only relevant to activities, not
 Daniel P. Schley, CFA, is an attorney at Portnoff Law Associates, Ltd. In King of
Prussia, Pennsylvania. He previously practiced law as a corporate associate at Davis Polk
& Wardwell LLP. He is a graduate of Cornell Law School, the Cornell Johnson Graduate
School of Management and Dartmouth College. The views expressed represent his alone
and are not attributable to any organization with which he is currently or previously
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1 See, e.g., Paddy Ireland, Limited Liability, Shareholder Rights and the Problem of
Corporate Irresponsibility, 34 CAMBRIDGE J. OF ECON. 837 (2010); Stephanie Blankenburg
et al., Limited Liability and the Modern Corporation in Theory and in Practice, 34
CAMBRIDGE J. OF ECON. 821 (2010).
2 See discussion infra Part II.
3 See discussion infra Part II.
4 See discussion infra Part III.
5 See discussion infra Parts II, IV.
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substances.6 With respect to shareholder personal liability for
corporate torts, the relevant activity is corporate capitalization,
not the shareholder contribution of equity capital and related
limited control rights (the substance). Because a corporation’s
officers and directors can prevent undercapitalization through
the use of due care, negligence—not strict liability—is the
appropriate regime for shareholder personal liability.7 Corporate
law understands this intuition by only allowing such liability
through the use of piercing the corporate veil, which resembles
negligence. Though tort law’s conclusions regarding shareholder
liability align with corporate law, tort law independently still
provides a valuable insight into understanding the hazy doctrine
of piercing the corporate veil and corporate purpose more
generally. This Article ends with some recommendations for
further research.
I. INTRODUCTION
The proper scope of the corporation remains a vigorous debate.
Often at its crux is shareholder limited liability. Numerous
academics note with suspicion this unique aspect of corporate law
which allows shareholders to avoid personal liability to a
corporation’s creditors.8 Generally only liable up to their
paid-in-capital, though able to reap potentially unlimited gains,
shareholders purportedly push corporations to take on excessive
risk.9 These risks are not merely financial (in the form of excess
leverage), but even legal: if a corporation breaks the law, it is only
the corporation—not the shareholders—that pays the penalty or
fine.10 These perverse incentives, coupled with the prevailing belief
under shareholder primacy theory that corporate managers have
the sole obligation to maximize shareholder profits,11 have led some
scholars to conclude that the corporation is best described in human
terms as a psychopath— irresponsible, manipulative, asocial, and
unable to feel remorse.12 Others conclude corporate limited liability

Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990).
This Article assumes that there has been no election under applicable law for
shareholder management of the corporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 351 (West
2020).
8 See, e.g., David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of
the Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139, 148 (2013).
9 See Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1247 (2002).
10 See Ciepley, supra note 8, at 148.
11 See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
12 See JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND
POWER 56–57 (2004).
6
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is merely a historical accident, which tort law would not tolerate.13
Academics claim the defects of the corporation create real
consequences for the economy at large and undermine economic
growth.14 With the rise of the shareholder primacy theory, limited
liability now poses an even greater risk as corporate management
own more stock and stock options.15 In the eyes of such critics,
limited liability is simply a mistake which should be eliminated.16
Other academics strenuously contest these conclusions about
the corporation and shareholder limited liability.17 Judge Frank
H. Easterbrook and Professor Daniel R. Fischel, for example,
defend limited liability noting that it decreases the need to
monitor investments and other shareholders, promotes free
transfer of shares, allows for market pricing and diversification,
and optimizes investment decisions.18
So, should shareholders retain limited liability? Or should
they instead be unlimitedly personally liable for corporate torts?
Would eliminating limited liability deter the purported corporate
incentive to externalize costs by encouraging shareholders to
monitor corporate activities more closely? Or are shareholders,
despite their limited control rights, just too powerless and
anonymous to influence managerial decisions?
One need not look further than to the absence of examples of
corporations failing to compensate their tort victims to reach the
conclusion that limited liability is a phantom problem.19 Where
are all of the uncompensated tort victims if limited liability
creates such inexorable danger? The reality is that shareholders
are largely unable to use the corporation to externalize costs onto
creditors. Other corporate stakeholders, like insurers,
13 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991) [hereinafter Toward Unlimited
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts]; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The
Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 431–32 (2000) [hereinafter The
Essential Role of Organizational Law].
14 See The Essential Role of Organizational Law, supra note 13.
15 See Ciepley, supra note 8, at 148; see also William Lazonick, Profits Without
Prosperity, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2014, at 3, 4–5.
16 See Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at
1880.
17 See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried & Charles C.Y. Wang, Short-Termism and Capital Flows
(Eur.
Corp.
Governance
Inst.,
Working
Paper
No.
342/2017,
2018),
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2895161.
18 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 94–96 (1985).
19 See Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital
Markets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387, 421 (1992) (“[T]he evidence is hardly
overwhelming that limited liability causes a significant increase in a corporation’s
willingness to engage in risky behavior.”).
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debtholders and officers and directors, have incentives aligned
with any potential tort creditor (that is, a contingent creditor)
and are successfully able to police the corporation to such
contingent creditor’s benefit. This is exactly why share prices in
California did not increase after the introduction of limited
liability.20 If cost externalization were possible, those share prices
would have increased.
Though concerns about limited liability may only exist in the
ivory tower, most critiques of shareholder personal liability have
relied on the practical difficulties of shareholder personal
liability.21 None, however, has focused on the theoretical—the
truth that tort law actually supports the current corporate law
limited liability regime.
Tort law would not hold shareholders personally liable for
corporate torts. This becomes obvious when analogizing personal
shareholder liability to tort law’s strict liability for abnormally
hazardous activities. Such strict liability attaches only to
activities, not substances. The relevant activity for shareholder
personal liability is corporate capitalization, not the contribution
of equity capital and limited associated shareholder control
rights. A corporation’s officers and directors, not its shareholders,
control corporate capitalization. Because when officers and
directors use due care, corporations are almost certainly able to
pay debts—including contingent debts like compensation to
potential tort creditors—as they come due, a shareholder would
not be strictly liable for corporate torts. A shareholder only
becomes liable to the extent he or she controls corporate
capitalization and then fails to use reasonable care in doing so.
As this Article explains in detail, that is merely to say that a
shareholder only faces personal liability when courts pierce the
corporate veil—the current corporate law regime.
This Article reaches these conclusions by analyzing whether
shareholders would be personally liable in tort law instead of
corporate law. Part II discusses recent developments in academic
understanding of the corporation and how they should affect the
interpretation of prior academic work. Part III introduces strict
liability, discusses its relevance to shareholders, and analogizes a
well-known strict liability case to the question of shareholder
liability for corporate torts. Part IV compares this Article’s
findings to the current state of corporate law for shareholder
20 See Mark I. Weinstein, Limited Liability in California 1928–31: It’s the Lawyers, 7
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 439, 440 (2005).
21 See generally Grundfest, supra note 19.
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liability for corporate torts. Part V reconsiders corporate purpose
in light of tort law. In conclusion, Part VI provides some final
remarks and suggestions of further relevant research.
II. SHAREHOLDER PERSONAL LIABILITY IN TORT TO THE
CORPORATION’S TORT CREDITORS
The most prominent argument for imposing shareholder
personal liability for corporate torts proposes liability based on two
justifications. One centers around the fact that it is inefficient and
unfair as a matter of policy for tort victims to have no control over
the type of legal entity that harms. The other supports shareholder
liability for corporate torts given their ownership of the corporation
and control of its capitalization. These justifications, however, are
misguided. First, tortious liability depends not merely on finding
the deepest pockets—because a corporation may or may not have
the requisite capital—but, rather, on providing proper incentives to
control outcomes. Moreover, shareholders neither truly own the
corporation nor sufficiently control corporate capitalization to justify
their personal liability for corporate acts.
A. The Prominent Argument in Tort Favoring Shareholder
Personal Liability
Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman provide
a prominent argument for shareholder personal liability.22 They
even posture that corporate limited liability likely is a vestige of
a historical accident in the development of corporate law.23 They
argue that it is simply too crude a check. Instead, they advance
the theory that, under tort law, shareholders should be
personally liable because they are in the best position to avoid
and insure against costs.24
Their principal rationale is that tort law would find
shareholder limited liability inefficient.25 Limited liability allows
shareholders to externalize costs onto society.26 Unlike corporate
contract creditors, a corporation’s tort creditors are unable, ex
ante, to negotiate for shareholder limited liability.27 Shareholders
take advantage of this putative loophole by undercapitalizing. 28

22
23
24

1918.

25
26
27
28

The Essential Role of Organizational Law, supra note 13, at 431.
Id.
See Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at
See The Essential Role of Organizational Law, supra note 13, at 431.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In doing so, shareholders not only leave tort creditors
uncompensated when the corporation is insolvent, but also
succeed in shielding their own personal assets from those
creditors.29 Involuntary creditors are therefore defenseless.30
Because these involuntary creditors have no control over the type
of legal entity that injures them, Hansmann and Kraakman note
that it is inefficient, not to mention unfair, to allow the amount a
tort victim recovers to depend merely upon the legal form of the
organization responsible for their injury.31 Shareholders
benefitting, for instance, “from intentional dumping of toxic
wastes, from marketing hazardous products without warnings, or
from exposing employees without their knowledge and consent to
working conditions known by the firm to pose substantial health
risks, should not be able to avoid the resulting costs simply by
limiting the capitalization of their firm.”32 Abolishing limited
liability would, in their view, force shareholders to face full
liability for potential tort losses. Share prices and the cost of
equity would decrease and increase, respectively, to account for
such liability.33
Hansmann and Kraakman suggest replacing shareholder
limited liability with a pro rata personal liability regime.34 They
caution that, in abolishing limited liability, courts would still
need to determine which costs are efficiently and equitably borne
by a corporation and its shareholders but note that shareholders
would, in at least certain circumstances, be in the best position to
avoid and insure against cost.35 In those situations, the authors
submit that shareholders should be personally liable for
corporate torts.36
The academic literature critiquing Hansmann and
Kraakman’s proposal have done so largely on practical grounds. 37
Professor Joseph A. Grundfest, for example, contends that capital
market participants are sufficiently agile to arbitrage away
personal liability for equity ownership.38 In Grundfest’s view,
shareholders would first rearrange themselves so that personal

Id. at 393–94.
Id.
See The Essential Role of Organizational Law, supra note 13, at 431–32.
32 Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at 1917.
33 See id. at 1907.
34 See id. at 1917–19.
35 See id.
36 See id.
37 See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 19, at 388 n.3; Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited
Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387, 387 (1992).
38 See id. at 390.
29
30
31
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assets would be unreachable under a proportionate personal
liability regime.39 Shareholders with personal wealth would only
purchase shares of companies with little risk of personal asset
exposure.40 Only persons with little or no personal assets or,
more likely, little to no asset exposure, would purchase the equity
of riskier firms.41 Furthermore, were proportionate personal
liability implemented at the state level, constitutional limitations
on personal jurisdiction would not allow jurisdiction over passive
shareholders.42 Even a statute at the federal level would face
problems obtaining personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants
given the principles of international comity.43
Constitutional problems are compounded by the logistics of
collection. Domestic shareholders not party to the original action
would attempt to relitigate.44 The value of shares owned by many
shareholders is less than the costs to proceed with an action
against them.45 Enforcing a judgment against a foreign
shareholder—or even identifying that shareholder—could be
impossible.46 Individuals with personal assets seeking exposure
to “riskier” equities could also avoid owning shares altogether
through derivatives, which would achieve returns similar to
those attained through ownership of traditional shares with
limited liability.47
Corporations themselves would respond adversely to
proportionate personal liability. They would issue less equity in
favor of debt and equity-like instruments, like convertible bonds
and warrants—all of which lack proportionate personal liability
of shares.48 Intermediaries like investment banks could create
structured products to allow the ultimate beneficiaries equity
like returns without the concomitant proportionate liability.49 No
amount of regulation would adequately prevent all of these
parties from ultimately protecting the shareholder-like party
from personal proportionate liability.50

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

See id. at 387.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 395.
See id. at 397.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 409.
Id. at 408.
Id. at 416.
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Though these critiques merit their own consideration, they
do not consider Hansmann and Kraakman’s underlying
theoretical claim that tort law would not allow shareholder
limited liability.51 This Article considers Hansmann and
Kraakman’s assumptions about both the corporation and tort law
with respect to shareholder limited liability.
B. The Prominent Basis in Tort Favoring Shareholder Personal
Liability Relies on Flawed Assumptions about both Tort Law and
the Corporation
Hansmann and Kraakman’s argument that tort law fails to
explain limited liability relies on questionable assumptions about
both tort law and the corporation. First, the Restatement of Torts
prefers allocative rather than distributive liability.52 In other
words, whether a defendant should be liable in tort—and under
which liability regime—should depend on which regime will most
effectively control outcomes, not who has the deepest pockets. 53
In determining shareholder personal liability for corporate torts,
however, Hansmann and Kraakman argue in favor of liability
based on the latter.54 They contend as a matter of policy that
shareholders ought to be personally liable merely because the
tort plaintiff has no control over the wealth of the tortfeasor
corporation.55 Indeed, they extrapolate from their position that
the amount of damages for shareholder liability should depend
on the structure of the particular corporate defendant;
shareholders who are corporate parents of a wholly-owned
subsidiary should bear greater costs for the subsidiary’s torts
than shareholders who are natural persons.56 These rationales
are inconsistent with tort doctrine. Tort liability, and the extent
of damages for such liability, is not simply based on whether the
defendant’s shareholders are artificial or natural persons—who
could, in theory, be equally as wealthy and equally as culpable. 57
51 See generally, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra
note 13.
52 See, e.g., Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1181 (7th
Cir. 1990).
53 Id. at 1181–82.
54 See Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at
1916–17.
55 Id.
56 See Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at
1917.
57 Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 110–11 (arguing courts may be more
likely to pierce the veil when the shareholder is a parent corporation of a corporate
subsidiary, but only because such a corporate shareholder is more likely to attempt to
externalize costs, not because such a corporate shareholder is wealthier than a natural
shareholder).
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Indeed, judgment-proof natural persons often leave victims
uncompensated, yet tort law does not strain to find some nexus to
a wealthier party. Rather, as even Hansmann and Kraakman
admit, liability should be based on the action in question and
which actors are in the best position to avoid the relevant
accidents.58 Hansmann and Kraakman offer no argument for why
shareholders are corporate actors in the best position to avoid
accidents.
They likely fail to do so because they reach their conclusions
based on two related yet problematic theories of the corporation,
which incorrectly describe the shareholder’s relationship with the
corporation. Under Property (“Principal/Agent”) Theory,
corporations are merely aggregations of shareholders’ property.59
Shareholders are therefore owners of the corporation and
principals for whom the corporate officers and directors serve as
agents.60 This statement, however, is more applicable to a
partnership where partners function as the sole owners and
central contracting parties of the partnership.61 A modern
business corporation, however, meaningfully departs from this
construct for two reasons. First, corporate assets and liabilities
belong not to shareholders, but to the corporation as a distinct
entity. Second, shareholders are not principals to whom the
directors owe duties as agents.62
Shareholders are not owners because they merely own
corporate stock—a contractual obligation between the
shareholder and the corporation.63 This contractual obligation
entitles shareholders to own neither the corporation nor its
assets.64 For example, owning Apple shares does not entitle a
shareholder to take iPads from an Apple store.65 The corporation
itself, rather, owns itself and its assets. A shareholder’s rights
with respect to a corporation are therefore not dissimilar to other
parties in contract with the corporation, such as debtholders.66

58

1916.

Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at

59 LYNN STOUT, The Economic Nature of The Corporation, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 337, 345 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017).
60 Id. at 345.
61 David Ciepley, Member Corporations, Property Corporations, and Constitutional
Rights, 11 LAW & ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 31, 43 (2017).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 45.
64 Id.
65 LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 37 (2012).
66 Id. at 37–38.
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Shareholders are also not principals to whom the directors
owe duties as their agents.67 A principal must “exist[] prior to,
and independent of, the hiring of the agent.”68 In a corporation,
however, it is only after the firm’s incorporator appoints a board
of directors to act on the corporation’s behalf that the corporation
has the power and ability to issue stock to shareholders.69 Only
the corporation and its board exist prior to the alleged principal
—the shareholders.70 Moreover, although shareholders have
certain limited rights (to vote on certain corporate matters, sue
the corporation, and sell shares), they do not control the
corporation’s behavior, a key component of agency.71 To the
contrary, the board of directors controls corporate actions.72
Hansmann and Kraakman, however, in the vein of Property
Theory, treat shareholders as owners and principals of the
corporation, and the corporate directors as the shareholders’ agents.73
They note the identical concern that both owners and
shareholders may use the corporate form to limit their personal
liability.74 One can only harmonize these statements by arguing
that they are in fact, identical—that shareholders are the owners
of the corporation. Moreover, their argument suggests
shareholder control such that they would, in fact, be principals.
They contend that shareholders—not the corporation through its
officers and directors—control the corporation’s capitalization.75
Only by ignoring the role of corporate directors are they able to
conclude that corporations themselves should have no liability at
all if shareholders have insufficient control over corporate
managers of the corporation.76 The board of directors and officers
control corporate capitalization, not shareholders.77 Shareholders
Id. at 42.
Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.04 (AM. L. INST. 2006).
72 ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 114
(4th ed., 2013).
73 See The Essential Role of Organizational Law, supra note 13, at 429.
74 Compare The Essential Role of Organizational Law, supra note 13, at 431
(“[O]rganizational law is essential to shield owners of an organization from personal
liability.”), with Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note
13, at 1917 (“Shareholders . . . should not be able to avoid . . . costs simply by limiting the
capitalization of their firm.”).
75 See Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at
1919.
76 Id. at 1908.
77 It is true that, subsequent to the issuance of shares, shareholders must normally
vote on changes to a corporation’s bylaws. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (West 2020).
The bylaws include the number of authorized shares a corporation may issue. See § 109(b)
(Westlaw). One could argue that shareholders could derivatively control corporate
67
68
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do not decide when to issue (or buy back) equity or debt, issue
dividends, when and how to insure for contingent liabilities, or
manage the corporation’s working capital.78 These actions fall
exclusively within the purview of the corporation’s board of
directors and its management.79 Only if one views the
shareholder as a principal, can one suggest actual shareholder
control of corporate assets—this is simply not the case in the
corporation.80 Finally, Hansmann and Kraakman’s remedies also
suggest a belief in shareholders as principals.81 For example,
they argue in favor of shareholder personal liability based on the
corporation’s management’s awareness that a plaintiff will file a
tort claim against the corporation.82 Such vicarious liability
ought only be imputed to the employee’s principal, which is the
corporation itself, not the shareholder.
A second theory on which Hansmann and Kraakman may
rely is Aggregate Theory, which treats the corporation as an
aggregation of natural persons.83 Under this view, corporations
are merely “composed” of human beings: “a form of organization
used by human beings to achieve desired ends.”84 Aggregate
Theory, similar to Property Theory, crucially fails to distinguish

capitalization by rejecting a corporation’s request for an increase in the number of
authorized shares so that the corporation could raise equity to provide for adequate
corporate capitalization. Such shareholder “control” of capitalization, however, is better
described as within the vein of ultra vires (that is, notice to shareholders of the scope of
the corporation) as opposed to actual control of corporate capitalization. See PINTO, supra
note 72. Indeed, several examples show how such alleged corporate control is illusory.
First, articles of incorporation may permit directors to adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws
without shareholder approval. See § 141 (Westlaw). Second, the corporation (through the
board of directors) does not need shareholder approval to purchase insurance (such as a
credit default swap) which could achieve results similar to an equity issuance. See id.
Finally, a corporation’s board of directors does not require shareholder approval of a
reverse stock split. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Reverse Stock Splits, (Aug. 16, 2020,
1:24
PM),
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investingbasics/glossary/reverse-stock-splits [http://perma.cc/XDT2-PS4V]. A reverse stock split
would reduce the number of shares outstanding, thereby allowing the corporation to issue
sufficient equity for adequate capitalization. See id. Despite shareholders’ limited control
rights, corporate capitalization ultimately remains in hands of the board of directors, not
shareholders.
78 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(c), 351 (West 2020).
79 Id. § 141(c).
80 True, such statements may not apply to controlling shareholders, who may
derivatively control a corporation and as such are subject to fiduciary duties. See Iman
Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties For Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1255, 1269–70 (2008). I discuss strict liability for controlling shareholders in a subsequent
section.
81 See Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at
1897.
82 See id.
83 See STOUT, supra note 59, at 344–45.
84 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 706 (2014).
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the corporate form, with its separate personality, from
partnerships or proprietorships. 85
In the vein of Aggregate Theory, Hansmann and Kraakman
treat the shareholders and the corporation as identical. They
note separate yet equivalent concerns that shareholders,
corporations, and owners should not be able to use limited
liability to externalize costs.86 These statements, when viewed
together, ignore that the corporation is an entity distinct from its
shareholders. Consider, for example, Hansmann and Kraakman’s
concern regarding a corporation’s ability to limit its liability.87
They do not suggest apprehension that a corporation can limit
liability through the creation of a subsidiary.88 Rather, they
express a concern that a corporation can limit its liabilities
through its own incorporation.89 Corporations cannot limit
liability differently than any natural person. Because a
corporation owns itself and is its own principal, it will be
vicariously liable for its agents’ actions in tort.90 Hansmann and
Kraakman can only argue such corporate use of limited liability
by treating the shareholder and corporation as identical.
Although Hansmann and Kraakman’s basis for shareholder
personal liability may be flawed, this does not necessarily
indicate that their conclusions are wrong. Tort law may still
suggest shareholder personal liability for corporate torts. The
relevant question, as even Hansmann and Kraakman
acknowledge, is whether shareholders have enough control over
corporate managers to have a significant effect on the probability

See STOUT, supra note 59, at 345.
Compare The Essential Role of Organizational Law, supra note 13, at 431
(“[O]rganizational law is essential to shield owners of an organization from personal
liability.”) (emphasis added), with Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate
Torts, supra note 13, at 1917 (“Shareholders . . . should not be able to avoid . . . costs
simply by limiting the capitalization of their firm.”) (emphasis added), and Toward
Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at 1919 (“[A]llowing
corporations to avoid tort liability through the simple device of limited liability seems . . .
highly suspect.”) (emphasis added).
87 See Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at
1919.
88 See id.
89 Id. (“We do not want to exaggerate our faith in tort law as a means of controlling
behavior. It is a very rough and costly mechanism. But it usefully discourages the most
severe forms of opportunistic cost externalization. Moreover, if any class of actors is likely
to respond rationally to the deterrence incentives created by tort law, it is corporations
and their shareholders. Similarly, if tort law is to have any role in shifting risks to lowcost insurers, then using it to shift risks to the equity market makes sense. Consequently,
allowing corporations to avoid tort liability through the simple device of limited liability
seems, at the very least, highly suspect.”) (emphasis added).
90 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.04, 3.04 (AM. L. INST . 2006).
85
86
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that the corporation will commit a tort.91 Although shareholders
are neither principals nor owners of the corporation, and are
distinct from the corporation itself, they do retain some control
through their capacity to vote, sue, and sell shares.92 What
amount of control, if any, should render them liable in tort for
corporate malfeasance?
III. RECONSIDERING SHAREHOLDER LIMITED LIABILITY IN TORT:
INTUITION AND APPLICABILITY OF STRICT LIABILITY AND
ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES
A. Strict Liability Provides an Appropriate Intuition for
Shareholder Personal Liability for Corporate Torts
To answer the question of how tort law would deal with
shareholder liability for corporate torts, we must first consider
which relevant accident control regime—strict liability or
negligence—would apply. Strict liability finds liability regardless
of the tortfeasor’s use of due care.93 As such, it is meant to control
care and activity levels, whereas negligence—the typical liability
regime in tort—controls only care levels.94 Care level refers to the
level of care one can adopt when engaging in an activity, such as
driving at a reasonable speed with reasonable caution.95 Activity
level, on the other hand, refers to the extent someone engages in
an activity at all, such as how often one drives a car.96 Although
negligence and strict liability have the same effect on care
levels—both incent an actor to take additional precaution to the
extent that it is less than the expected costs of an accident—only
a strict liability regime encourages an actor not to engage in the
activity at all.97
Professor George Fletcher argues that strict liability rules
should apply when an actor exposes another to non-reciprocal
risks: an asymmetry where an actor’s conduct endangers
another, but the latter’s conduct does not endanger the former. 98

91 See Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at
1907–08.
92 See generally, Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate
Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 215, 216–17 (1999).
93 See Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
94 Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Immunity: An Application to
Cyberspace, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2007).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 10–11.
98 Cf. PINTO, supra note 72, at 250.
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Strict liability is alternatively, though similarly, described
through a ratio test where the “costs externalized by an activity,
even when conducted with reasonable care, substantially exceed
the benefits externalized by that activity.”99 For example, two
motorists driving past each other present one another with
approximately equal risks. This is not the case, however, when a
motorist drives past a blasting site and blasts shatter the
motorist’s window. The use of explosives presents the motorist
with a non-reciprocal risk (and costs externalized far greater
than benefits externalized), for which the defendant in charge of
the blasting site ought to be strictly liable. Strict liability
therefore incentivizes blasters not only to consider using proper
care in blasting but also to decide where to blast (i.e., away from
cars), and to explore the feasibility of using safer substitutes (like
a wrecking ball).100
Strict liability offers an appropriate analogy to limited
liability. First, by focusing on the activity level, it addresses
academics’ concern that incorporation permits shareholders to
externalize too many costs onto society in relation to benefits.
Strict liability would hold shareholders liable despite their
exercise of reasonable care, thereby discouraging owning stock in
a way that mere negligence cannot: incenting shareholders to
consider other organizational forms where capital providers are
personally liable (i.e., partnerships and proprietorships), or
proceed as shareholders (with personal liability) at their own
peril.101
Second, limited liability presents a non-reciprocal risk. Those
persons with whom the corporation comes into contact (including
both voluntary and involuntary creditors) are likely natural
persons, with an assumed basic level of economic worth and
earning capacity. The corporation, on the other hand, is by
definition artificial and can easily exist without any such basic
assumptions. The corporation could be a shell—completely
worthless. Robert Monks aptly noted, “[t]he great problem of
having corporate citizens is that they aren’t like the rest of us.”102
“As Baron Thurlow in England is supposed to have said, ‘they
have no soul to save, and they have no body to incarcerate.’”103
Perhaps this is Hansmann and Kraakman’s actual concern
Hylton, supra note 94, at 12.
See Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir.
1990); see also Hylton, supra note 94, at 12.
101 JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 249 (5th ed. 2013).
102 THE CORPORATION (Big Picture Media Corp. 2003).
103 Id.
99
100
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regarding the corporate form: not that a corporation may be
impecunious per se (because, judgment-proof natural persons
similarly may leave uncompensated tort victims), but rather that
their artificiality makes them (and their ownership of assets)
distinctly unlike natural persons. Strict liability would address
this non-reciprocal risk to society.
Third, strict liability still retains a proximate cause
analysis.104 Proximate cause is an additional limitation on a
defendant’s culpability which requires that the defendant be
liable only if their conduct is not only the actual cause of the
plaintiff’s injury, but is also the cause as a matter of policy.105
Proximate cause attempts to delimit a defendant’s liability to the
kind of harm the possibility of which makes the activity
abnormally dangerous.106 For example, in a famous strict liability
case, a blasting operator who used reasonable care was not
strictly liable to a plaintiff mink rancher whose mother mink
trampled its kittens upon the vibrations resulting from the
blasting.107 Proximate cause precluded liability given that the
plaintiff’s mink ranching was an extraordinary and unusual use
of his land.108
Conventional proximate cause analysis is consistent with
shareholder personal liability. Even Hansmann and Kraakman
would limit shareholder liability for corporate torts to tort
damages that the corporation’s assets cannot cover.109 Inability to
pay tort creditors due to corporate undercapitalization is exactly
the type of harm that makes the corporate form dangerous.
Specifically, the corporation and its shareholders would use
limited liability to externalize costs onto others.
One particular Restatement form of strict liability—liability
for abnormally dangerous activities—provides an intuitive
framework for owning stock.110 Although liability for abnormally
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 101, at 267.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
107 Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 268 P.2d 645, 646 (Wash. 1954).
108 Id. at 648.
109 See Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at
1891–92.
110 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519–20 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977). True, one
could argue that one should analyze shareholder strict liability under an analogy to the
possession of livestock under the Restatement. How different, after all, is a psychopath
from a wild animal? Cf id. § 504. My argument that owning stock is not an abnormally
dangerous activity, however, would also—just as forcefully—indicate that owning stock
under an analogy to livestock is not an activity for which a shareholder is strictly liable.
Possessors of livestock are notably not strictly liable if the damages are “brought about by
the . . . reckless or negligent conduct of a third person.” Id. § 504(3)(c). A corporation’s
104
105
106
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dangerous activities attaches to ownership of tangible property or
physical activity,111 Hansmann and Kraakman argue that
“limited liability encourages excessive entry and aggregate
overinvestment in unusually hazardous industries”112—the exact
same types of activities to which strict liability often attaches.
Moreover, it is not unthinkable that a court could consider
applying theories of strict liability to the ownership of intangible
assets—academics have analyzed the possible application of tort
doctrine, including strict liability, to such intangible ventures as
the provision of Internet services.113 Given these similarities,
would shareholders be liable under this Restatement test?
Should owning stock be considered an abnormally dangerous
activity (or sufficiently analogous to it)?114
B. Is Owning Stock an Abnormally Dangerous Activity?
Introducing the Restatement and Indiana Harbor Belt
Given the seeming compatibility between theories of strict
liability and owning stock, it is worth exploring whether merely
owning stock is sufficiently analogous to be considered an
abnormally dangerous activity. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts (Sections 519–20) gives a guideline for determining
whether an activity is abnormally dangerous115:
One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to
liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting
from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to
prevent the harm. . . .
....
. . . In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the
following factors are to be considered:

officers and directors are such third persons.
111 See id. § 520 cmt. f (noting that an activity must create a danger of physical harm
in order to be abnormally dangerous).
112 Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at
1883.
113 See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 94, at 16, 28 (analogizing digital code to physical
property in order to apply tort doctrine, including strict liability, to Internet-borne
injuries).
114 Arguably shareholding’s creation of physical harm is too derivative or too
intangible to consider it an abnormally dangerous activity. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1977). However, as will become apparent, strict
liability for abnormally dangerous activities crucially relies on a distinction between
substances and activities. Such a distinction provides a strong analogy to the question of
holding shareholders strictly liable for corporate torts and the conclusion that a
negligence regime would apply.
115 See id. §§ 519–520.
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(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land
or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on;
and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes.116

The Section 520 factors on their face seem to offer mixed
guidance.117 Some support the proposition that owning stock is
abnormally dangerous.118 With regard to factor (c), shareholders
(in such capacity) generally cannot eliminate the risk of
undercapitalization by the exercise of reasonable care given that
the board of directors and other delegated managerial officers
control corporate activities, including decisions concerning
corporate capitalization.119 Regarding factors (a) and (b), as
mentioned, incorporation incentivizes investment in unusually
hazardous industries which are inherently risky and potentially
expose the corporation to massive tort liability for physical
harm.120 Moreover (although perhaps not an issue of locality),
under factor (e), through analogy, incorporation is clearly not
always the appropriate legal entity through which a business
firm should conduct its activities.121 In certain circumstances,
such as when a corporation may be undercapitalized,122 a
partnership or proprietorship is clearly preferable in order to
limit cost externalization.
Two factors are also unclear. Consider whether corporations
are of common usage under factor (d). The Restatement comment
on ‘common usage’ distinguishes between “automobiles [which]
have come into such general use that their operation is a matter
of common usage,” and “the operation of a tank or any other
motor vehicle of such size and weight as to be unusually difficult

Id.
See id.
See id.
119 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(c).
120 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(a–b); see also The Essential Role of
Organizational Law, supra note 13, at 423, 431–32.
121 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(e).
122 A corporation is undercapitalized when it fails “in good faith [to] put at the risk of
the business unincumbered [sic] capital reasonably adequate for its prospective
liabilities.” HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 303 (rev. ed.
1946).
116
117
118
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to control safely, or to be likely to damage the ground over which
it is driven,” which is “abnormally dangerous.”123 Should
corporations be considered cars or tanks? One the one hand, if
the corporation in fact behaves irresponsibility toward society at
large, is it not akin to a tank on the road? On the other,
corporations are ubiquitous—undercapitalized corporations
arguably less so. Finally, with regards to factor (f), as discussed
in the introduction, it is unclear whether incorporation (and
therefore limited liability) provides the community more value
than the danger it presents. The Section 520 factors on their face
are either indeterminate or favor strict liability. Moreover,
Section 519 requires that the defendant be in control of the
alleged abnormally dangerous activity.124 Do shareholders,
through their limited control rights, have sufficient control over
the corporation to be held strictly liable for corporate activity?
Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company v. American
Cyanamid Co., a well-known strict liability case decided by Judge
Richard Posner, helps shed light on both the Section 520 factors
and Section 519 control.125 In Indiana Harbor Belt, a chemical
manufacturer, American Cyanamid Company (“Cyanamid”),
leased a railroad tank car, filled it with a hazardous chemical
(acrylonitrile), and shipped it.126 A Missouri Pacific Railroad
train picked up the car.127 Later, at a small switching line within
the Chicago metropolitan area, the switching line employees
noticed fluid gushing from the bottom outlet of the car. 128 The
Department of Environmental Protection subsequently ordered
the switching line to take decontamination measures.129 The
switching line sued Cyanamid for the costs of those measures.130
The plaintiff argued that the transportation of acrylonitrile
in bulk through the Chicago metropolitan area was an
abnormally dangerous activity for which the manufacturer
should be held strictly liable.131 The plaintiff argued that the
defendant, as an ordinary manufacturer and passive shipper of
hazardous materials, should be incented through strict liability
to explore alternative shipping routes through less populated
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519.
125 Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990).
126 Id. at 1175 (describing acrylonitrile as “flammable at temperatures above 30
degrees Fahrenheit, highly toxic, and possibly carcinogenic.”).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 1181.
123
124
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areas.132 According to the plaintiff’s argument, introducing a
hazardous chemical into a stream of commerce passing through
the Chicago metropolitan area was enough to hold the
manufacturer strictly liable.133
Judge Posner rejected this argument and, in doing so,
elaborated on the Section 520 factors, in particular Section 520(c)
(the inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable
care).134 In his view, someone could have prevented the accident
through the use of reasonable care:
No one suggests . . . that the leak in this case was caused by the
inherent properties of acrylonitrile. It was caused by carelessness—
whether that of the [railroad tank car lessor] in failing to maintain or
inspect the car properly, or that of Cyanamid in failing to maintain or
inspect it, or that of the Missouri Pacific when it had custody of the
car, or that of the switching line itself in failing to notice the ruptured
lid, or some combination of these possible failures of care. Accidents
that are due to a lack of care can be prevented by taking care; and
when a lack of care can . . . be shown in court, such accidents are
adequately deterred by the threat of liability for negligence.135

Judge Posner held that because proper care of tank cars
made the danger of an acrylonitrile spill negligible, there was no
compelling reason to move to a regime of strict liability.136
Judge Posner also helps us understand the bounds of Section
519 control. Throughout his opinion, Judge Posner emphasized
that the relevant activity for determining liability was not the
mere manufacture of a dangerous chemical, but rather its
transportation.137 To this end, he contrasted the defendant
Cyanamid, the manufacturer-shipper, with the acrylonitrile
carrier.138 Although manufacturer-shippers can, in theory,
designate in the bill of lading a route of shipment, shippers
cannot be expected to become “students of railroading in order to
lay out the safest route by which to ship their goods.”139 They, as
manufacturer-shipper, were not the relevant controlling actor
best suited to determine whether to reroute hazardous chemicals.
That actor was the chemical carrier:
[U]ltrahazardousness or abnormal dangerousness is, in the
contemplation of the law at least, a property not of substances, but of
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id.
Id. at 1175–80.
Id. at 1179.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 1181.
Id. at 1180.
Id.
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activities: not of acrylonitrile, but of the transportation of acrylonitrile
by rail through populated areas. Natural gas is both flammable and
poisonous, but the operation of a natural gas well is not an
ultrahazardous activity. . . . [T]he manufacturer of a product is not
considered to be engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity merely
because the product becomes dangerous when it is handled or used in
some way after it leaves his premises, even if the danger is
foreseeable. . . . The relevant activity is transportation, not
manufacturing and shipping.140

For these reasons, the manufacturer-shipper was held to be
not strictly liable.141
Judge Posner went on to express skepticism that the
imposition of strict liability would have actually changed the
aggregate expected accident costs.142 Even putting aside that
rerouting would be prohibitively expensive—because new tracks
would be needed to avoid metropolitan areas—it would require
longer journeys over poorer quality tracks.143 Though the cost of
each individual accident may decrease, the probability of an
accident may very well increase.144
Judge Posner did, in dicta, note that he could not exclude
liability for the Indiana Harbor Belt defendant in certain
hypothetical scenarios.145 Were there a less hazardous chemical
substitute (non-existent in this case), a manufacturer could be
strictly liable for shipment.146 Such an argument—relying on the
inherent properties of acrylonitrile—would encourage the
defendant to relocate the shipment or, more likely, reduce its
scale by substitution.147 This would be especially true in a
jurisdiction that accepts the Restatement Section 521 view that
because common carriers cannot refuse service to a shipper of a
lawful commodity, they are exempt from strict liability for the
carriage of abnormally dangerous materials.148 Because of this
exemption, the manufacturer is in a stronger relative position to
consider whether to reroute its dangerous materials.149 Moreover,
Cyanamid’s active participation in the chemical shipment by
leasing and filling the tank car and contracting with the tank car

140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

Id. at 1181 (citations omitted).
See id.
See id. at 1179.
See id. at 1180.
See id.
See id. at 1178.
See id. at 1181.
See id.
Id. at 1180.
See id.
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lessee to maintain the tank car indicates that the shipper was
sufficiently engaged in the relevant activity of transportation.150
At the same time, however, Judge Posner noted this active
participation may not necessarily indicate that strict liability
ought to apply: active participation “imposed upon [Cyanamid] a
duty of due care and by doing so brought into play a threat of
negligence liability that, for all we know, may provide an
adequate regime of accident control in the transportation of this
particular chemical.”151
C. Is Owning Stock an Abnormally Dangerous Activity?
Applying the Restatement and Indiana Harbor Belt
Indiana Harbor Belt provides valuable insight into whether
owning stock is an abnormally dangerous activity. First, Indiana
Harbor Belt makes clear that factor 520(c) (inability to eliminate
the risk by the exercise of reasonable care) refers not just to any
individual actor, but rather to that actor in the context of others.152
In the context of the corporation, there normally are actors who
can, through the use of reasonable care, mitigate the threat of cost
externalization. Those actors are not the corporation’s
shareholders, but rather its officers and directors. Officers and
directors control corporate activities and, most relevant to
shareholder personal liability, corporate capitalization.153 Like the
carriers in control of a manufacturer’s dangerous chemicals,
officers and directors control shareholders’ capital. When officers
and directors use proper care, the risk that a corporation
undercapitalizes and thereby leaves its tort creditors
uncompensated becomes negligible.
Judge Posner’s comments on adequate control under Section
519 of the Restatement also shed light on the relevant activity
necessary for the imposition of strict liability.154 Just as the
manufacture of a volatile chemical merely constitutes the
substance and its transportation the relevant activity, in the case
of a corporation, stock ownership is the substance and corporate
capitalization the activity. The relevant activity in the context of
shareholder limited liability is not whether shareholders have
provided (manufactured) the substance (capital) to the

150 Id. at 1181. Because the district court and plaintiff’s counsel ignored any
distinction between a passive and active shipper and merely argued liability based on
being the former, the court considered the distinction waived. Id.
151 Id.
152 See id. at 1177; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520.
153 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 141–142 (West 2020).
154 Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1990).
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corporation, but rather how the corporation has decided to deploy
capital (including any shareholder capital contribution). Though
the manufacturer-shipper has some limited and derivative
control over shipment of its chemicals, it ultimately entrusts the
carrier to transport those chemicals in a specific manner.
Shareholders in such capacity almost identically have limited
control rights over their capital contribution but entrust their
capital with the corporation’s officers and directors with the hope
that they will deploy it and obtain an acceptable return on such
capital.155 Even though it may be foreseeable that corporate
officers and directors would deploy shareholder capital in a way
that is dangerous (e.g., by undercapitalizing and externalizing
costs onto third parties), shareholders in such capacity do not
sufficiently engage in the activity to be strictly liable. Recall that
even the decision whether to incorporate a firm (as opposed to
creating a partnership) is in the hands of the board of directors,
not shareholders.156 A corporation must be in existence before its
shareholders are created.157 Shareholders are simply the
manufacturer-shippers; corporate officers and directors are the
carriers.158
Judge Posner’s concern that strict liability is not applicable
to the activity of transportation because it would not result in the
desired lowering of expected accident costs rings true here as
well.159 Judge Posner noted that rerouting would increase the
length of the journey over poorer track.160 Just as rerouting
would increase the length of the journey, shareholder personal
liability would increase the cost of capital for projects. 161 Because
raising capital would become more difficult, corporations would
be incentivized to attempt identical projects with less capital (i.e.,
undercapitalize). Just as rerouting may lead to the use of poorer
tracks162, shareholder personal liability may lead to the
contribution of inferior capital. Because debtholders retain
limited liability, debt would become more favorable than equity,
leading to excessive corporate leverage. Relatedly, an adverse
selection problem may arise: poorer investors with fewer
personal assets to lose will be more likely to invest as
shareholders. So even if shareholders are personally liable, they
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162

See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ch. 1 (West 2020).
STOUT, supra note 65, at 42.
Id.
Indiana Harbor Belt, 916 F.2d at 1177–78.
Id.
Id. at 1180.
Id.
Id.
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may not ultimately have the personal capital available to satisfy
tort creditors. Ultimately, it is unlikely that there will be fewer
uncompensated tort victims with the imposition of shareholder
personal liability.163
Although Judge Posner does list in dicta some factors that
may have made Cyanamid (the manufacturer-shipper) more
likely to be held strictly liable164, they are not relevant to stock
ownership. For example, he mentions the difference between an
active and passive shipper.165 One could argue that controlling or
activist shareholders should in this vein be strictly liable given
that they have adequate control over the corporation and thereby
become more like a chemical carrier. Again, the key question is
whether negligence liability would prove an adequate regime of
accident control. Ultimately, the corporation’s officers and
directors still may use due care so as to make such accidents
(that is, undercapitalization resulting in the externalization of
costs) negligible. Judge Posner also mentions the possibility of
strict liability if there were a less dangerous substitute for
acrylonitrile and if the carriers were not held strictly liable for
carrying lawful goods.166 Given that capital is fungible and that a
corporation may reject certain capital in exchange for shares, an
argument for shareholder strict liability based on the availability
of less dangerous substitutes is not meaningfully applicable. 167
The clear conclusion from the Restatement and Indiana Harbor
Belt is that shareholders in tort are not strictly liable when
corporations
undercapitalize.168
Negligence—the
use
of
163 See generally Grundfest, supra note 19, passim (explaining that the imposition of
personal liability onto shareholders is easily circumvented and will not have the intended
effect of increasing the corporation’s duty of care).
164 See 916 F.2d at 1180.
165 Id. at 1181.
166 Id. at 1180.
167 A situation where a shareholder could theoretically be strictly liable for his capital
contribution would be if he had contributed not cash, but rather some sort of other asset
with such illiquidity or volatility that it was ultimately worthless in the hands of the
corporation directly leading to a corporation’s undercapitalization. Consider, for example,
an exotic derivative product with an active market before the financial crisis which after
the crisis became worthless. True, holding such shareholders strictly liable may not be a
feasible method of accident avoidance given that directors perhaps breach their duty of
care by accepting such capital. Were directors, however, like common carriers—required
to accept any type of legal capital for stock—there would be a strong argument for such
shareholder strict liability in this limited hypothetical situation. Shareholders could
easily avoid the accident (by contributing a liquid, low volatility asset like cash) and the
corporation could not (by refusing to accept such capital contribution).
168 See generally Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1177 (7th
Cir. 1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-520.
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reasonable care—provides a sufficient regime under which to
prevent corporate undercapitalization.
IV. CORPORATE LAW COMPARED
How does corporate law’s treatment of shareholder liability
differ from the treatment under tort law? Under corporate law,
shareholders are generally not personally liable to a corporation’s
creditors beyond their capital investment in the corporation.169
This privilege, however, is not absolute.170 Shareholders may
become personally liable for a corporation’s liabilities (including
to tort creditors) under the equitable doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil.171 Though piercing the corporate veil is a poorly
understood and hazy doctrine,172 creditors successfully do so in
certain limited circumstances. First, in all instances, the
shareholders exert a high degree of control over the
corporation.173 Second, in the context of a tort claim, courts
examine two general categories to determine liability: respect for
corporate formalities and corporate capitalization.174 Courts
generally require finding both to pierce the corporate veil.175
Corporate formalities, in turn, may be grouped into legal,
economic, and operational formalities.176 Legal formalities
include whether to issue stock certificates, hold meetings, elect
officers, and document loans and other transactions.177 Economic
formalities refer to whether shareholders intermix their personal
affairs with the corporation, such as failing to maintain a
separate bank account for the corporation.178 Operational
formalities refer to whether the corporation and shareholder
share offices, employees, or otherwise seem to operate
identically.179 To avoid undercapitalization and denial of separate
entity privileges, “shareholders should in good faith put at the

See, e.g, Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.22(b) (1985).
See generally, Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical
Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991).
171 Id. at 1036.
172 Id. at 1036–37.
173 See Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 1991).
174 See id. When the creditor is a contract creditor, courts often ask whether the
debtor misled the contract creditor regarding the corporation’s capitalization. See
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 112.
175 See Kinney Shoe Corp., 939 F.2d at 212.
176 See id. at 211–12 (grouping the factors identified in Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc. into
three overarching categories).
177 See id.
178 See id.
179 See id. at 211.
169
170

Do Not Delete

2020]

5/17/2021 8:08 AM

Is Owning Stock an Abnormally Dangerous Activity?

79

risk of the business unincumbered [sic] capital reasonably
adequate for its prospective liabilities.”180
Analysis of tort law’s treatment of limited liability sheds
light on the hazy doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. The
elements present in piercing the corporate veil perform the same
function as those of tortious negligence. In order for a plaintiff to
recover in a negligence action, he must establish (1) that the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) that the defendant
breached this duty by failing to use reasonable care, (3) which
was the cause-in-fact and proximate cause of (4) plaintiff’s losses,
or damages.181 When a shareholder fails to respect corporate
formalities and controls the corporation , he personally has
assumed a duty of care to corporate creditors both actual (i.e., in
contract) and contingent (i.e., in tort).182 When a shareholder
further undercapitalizes his corporation, thereby leaving a
corporate creditor uncompensated, he breaches this duty by
failing to use reasonable care. Such undercapitalization (a
properly capitalized corporation would have been able to
compensate reasonably the creditor)—the cause-in-fact and
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s loss—results in shareholder
personal liability to the plaintiff creditor for the resulting
damages.
True, under this framework, reasonable capitalization would
still, at times, leave tort creditors uncompensated. But other
corporate creditors (such as debtholders) are frequently left
uncompensated. Though contract creditors were able, ex ante, to
negotiate and price corporate risk, there is no fundamental
difference in the price of risk (i.e., the risk of externalized costs)
when one negotiates for actual financial debt as compared to
appropriately insuring for contingent debt including debt owed to
any potential tort creditor. Insurance performs the same ex ante
function of risk pricing as the contract negotiation. Moreover, tort
creditors of non-corporate natural persons are also, at times,
ultimately uncompensated. The negligence regime merely forces a
corporation—an artificial person—to mimic a natural one. A
properly capitalized corporation faces no greater threat to society of
externalizing costs than any other natural person. There is
therefore no additional need in tort to force on the corporation’s
shareholders the task of providing the corporation with additional
insurance beyond what the corporation reasonably requires.
BALLANTINE, supra note 122, at 303.
DIAMOND ET AL, supra note 101, at 45.
182 Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1269 (2008).
180
181
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One could argue that when a plaintiff successfully pierces
the corporate veil, he normally may pierce the veil as to all
shareholders, those more innocent and culpable alike.183 This, in
turn, indicates that hypothetically innocent shareholders are
strictly
liable
for
corporate
torts
and
corporate
undercapitalization.184 As an example of a relatively innocent
shareholder who would have been held liable, some point to
Minton v. Cavaney.185 In that case, two promoters created a
corporation to lease a swimming pool but never capitalized it (it
never had any assets) and failed to respect corporate formalities,
such as issuing stock.186 Cavaney, an attorney, assisted the two
promoters in a temporary capacity as secretary, treasurer, and
director of the corporation, likely as an accommodation to his
client.187 When a victim drowned in the pool, her survivors, after
winning a judgment against the corporation, sued Cavaney’s
estate.188 Although reversed on other grounds, the court would
have found Cavaney personally liable, noting that he was to
receive one-third of the shares to be issued and that Cavaney
kept corporate records in his office.189
There are two problems with relying on Minton to conclude
that innocent shareholders are “strictly liable” for corporate torts.
First, when piercing the corporate veil, courts have normally not
held truly passive shareholders personally liable.190 Second, to
the extent that relatively innocent shareholders are liable, such
liability is within the vein of Res Ipsa Loquitur, a negligence
claim, not strict liability. Normally, a plaintiff bears the burden
of proving each element of a negligence cause of action by a
preponderance of the evidence.191 However, the doctrine of Res
Ipsa Loquitur allows a plaintiff in limited situations to use
circumstantial evidence to establish a defendant’s unreasonable
conduct.192 It allows a jury to infer from that circumstantial
conduct that a defendant acted unreasonably without any other
proof.193 The circumstantial evidence is crucial to plaintiffs who
otherwise would be unable to make specific allegations about

183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193

PINTO, supra note 72, at 58–59.
See id.
See id. at 59.
Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 578–79 (1961).
Id. at 578.
Id.
Id. at 580.
See PINTO, supra note 72, at 59–60.
DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 101, at 73.
Id.
Id.
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defendant malfeasance.194 Under the Restatement (Third) of
Torts, Res Ipsa Loquitur allows the factfinder to “infer that the
defendant has been negligent when the accident causing the
plaintiff’s harm is a type of accident that ordinarily happens as a
result of the negligence of a class of actors of which the defendant
is the relevant member.”195 Put slightly differently, Res Ipsa
Loquitur requires that the harm-causing event was probably due
to negligence, and that the defendant was probably the culpable
party.
The defendant’s suggested liability in Minton arose in such a
way. The harm—the corporation’s failure to satisfy a tort
creditor’s judgment (i.e., undercapitalization)—was due to the
board of directors’ negligence (failure to use reasonable care in
capitalizing the corporation).196 Moreover, the defendant was
probably a culpable party.197 Judge Roger Traynor noted that
“evidence that Cavaney was to receive one-third of the shares to
be issued supports an inference that he was an equitable owner,
and the evidence that for a time the records of the corporation
were kept in Cavaney’s office supports an inference that he
actively participated in the conduct of the business.”198 The
Defendant in Minton simply would have been unable to overcome
these inferences (i.e., his burden): the defendant’s relationship
with the promoters and the corporation itself was enough to
establish the inference that he had sufficient control (that is, the
act was probably negligence) over the corporation to be
personally liable to its creditors (that is, he was probably the
culpable party).
Indeed, this is exactly a distinction Judge Posner discusses
in Indiana Harbor Belt to highlight the difference between strict
liability and negligence.199 In Indiana Harbor Belt, Judge Posner
contrasts Siegler, where the court imposed strict liability on a
transporter of hazardous materials. There, a gasoline truck blew
up, obliterating Plaintiff’s decedent and decedent’s car. The
explosion destroyed the evidence necessary to establish whether
the accident had been due to negligence.200 Though the Siegler
Plaintiff could have tried to base his claim in negligence through
Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 17
(AM. L. INST. 2010).
196 Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 578, 580 (1961).
197 Id. at 580.
198 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
199 See Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F. 2d 1174, 1179–80 (7th
Cir. 1990).
200 Id.
194
195
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the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, the Siegler court turned to
strict liability instead of Res Ipsa Loquitur because even if the
defendant truck driver used all due care, a gasoline truck might
well blow up without negligence on the part of the driver. 201 In
such a case, a plaintiff would be unable to invoke Res Ipsa
Loquitur. The Plaintiff switching lines in Indiana Harbor Belt
did not show such a danger.202
Similarly, corporate undercapitalization does not present
involuntary creditors with a risk that they could not otherwise
prove fault without a strict liability regime. Though corporations
may seem at times to “blow up,” there is always an evidentiary
record (or lack thereof) to show whether a shareholder respected
corporate formalities and adequately capitalized the corporation.
The piercing the corporate veil regime again follows this logic.
Res Ipsa Loquitur also helps illustrate the scope of piercing
the corporate veil. Piercing only occurs within close corporations or
within corporate groups, not public companies.203 As the number of
shareholders increase, the less likely it becomes that a court will
pierce.204 This is because, as Res Ipsa Loquitur suggests, with an
increasing number of shareholders, it becomes more difficult for a
tort plaintiff to suggest that the negligent conduct was probably
tied to the particular shareholder defendant. Corporate law follows
the logic tort law suggests: Shareholders are not strictly liable for
corporate undercapitalization. They only become liable to the
extent that they assume certain duties through the failure to
respect corporate formalities and corporate control and then
breach such duties by failing to use reasonable care in capitalizing
the corporation.
V. CORPORATE PURPOSE RECONSIDERED
As discussed, the choice of regime between negligence and
strict liability is one of comparison between externalized costs
and benefits. When an activity externalizes more costs, strict
liability ought to apply. When an activity externalizes more
benefits, a negligence regime ought to apply.205 The idea that
shareholders ought not be strictly liable for corporate
undercapitalization therefore implies that incorporation
externalizes more benefits than costs.

201
202
203
204
205

Id.
Id. at 1179–80.
See Thompson, supra note 170, at 1039.
Id.
See Hylton, supra note 94, at 14.
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What is that externalized benefit? Shareholder provision of
capital to corporations allows for the facilitation of optimal
investment decisions.206 Under Modern Portfolio Theory, investors
can minimize risk through diversification. This minimization, in
turn, allows corporations a lower cost of capital because a
corporation’s officers and directors need not consider non-systematic
risk in making decisions. In a world of unlimited or strict
shareholder liability, projects with a positive net present value
(“NPV”) i.e., those that would benefit society would be rejected
because the value of shares would be based not merely on the
present value of the corporation’s expected future cash flows, but
also something irrelevant to the investment decision: shareholder
wealth. Piercing the corporate veil—a negligence regime—allows
society to undertake NPV positive projects because incorporation
allows a project to separate itself from its capital investors and
stand on its own merits.207
Piercing the corporate veil, however, teaches that although
corporations do externalize benefits to society, they still invite
shareholder opportunism (that is, externalized costs) when
certain shareholders attempt to use the corporate form to
artificially limit liabilities to creditors. For this reason, in order
for shareholders to truly limit their liability, they must follow
corporate formalities and, if acting as a corporate officer and/or
director, adequately capitalize the corporation. These actions not
only allow the corporation to stand on its own merits, but also
relieve the shareholder from a personal duty to corporate
creditors. This is because such actions force the corporation to
internalize the costs that it would otherwise externalize onto its
creditors.
This is why—perhaps ironically—shareholders are only able
to limit their liability when there is no ex ante value to limited
liability. This is the case in a properly functioning corporation.
True, shareholders may have an incentive to externalize these
costs. Other corporate actors, however, have incentives not only
contra the shareholders but also aligned with contingent (tort)
creditors. Those actors typically mute any shareholder incentive
to externalize costs. For example, because unsecured debtholders
have a claim pari passu with a tort creditor, in exchange for debt
capital, a debtholder will demand from the borrower and its
subsidiaries an affirmative covenant to maintain reasonable
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 97.
Corp.
Fin.
Inst.,
Modern
Portfolio
Theory
(MPT),
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/trading-investing/modernportfolio-theory-mpt/ [http://perma.cc/YE36-L2X5] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
206
207
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insurance.208 This covenant is ubiquitous with the possible
exception of investment-grade borrowers with multi-billion dollar
market capitalizations—enough to cover potential losses arising
from a corporate tort.209 Without this covenant, the debtholder
faces the material risk that a tort creditor’s claim will dilute his
or her own. Corporate officers and directors—who not only have a
substantial human capital investment in the corporation but also
may face personal liability for their action (or inaction)—will also
push the corporation to adequately insure so as to protect their
human capital investment and personal assets. Even if
putatively improperly incentivized by ownership of stock and
stock options, risk aversion will lead Corporate Officers and
Directors to D&O insurance.210 In turn, those insurers will
increase their premiums in order to account for the costs of bad
corporate governance. 211 As such, corporate actors are generally
able to force the corporation to internalize otherwise externalized
costs.212
Piercing the corporate veil is needed when the corporation is
not properly functioning—specifically, when other corporate
actors are unable to prevent shareholders from successfully
attempting to extract value from limited liability.213 To best
understand when piercing the corporate veil applies, consider the
relationship between shareholders and actual corporate creditors
(namely debtholders), whose relationship can best be explained
in terms of option theory. Both shareholders and debtholders
have purchased a right to a corporation’s future profits and
concomitantly made agreements with each other. Debtholders
have sold a call option (the right to purchase any increase in a
corporation’s value) on future profits to shareholders.
Shareholders, meanwhile, have bought a put option from
debtholders (that is, they have purchased the right to sell the
corporation to debtholders). Shareholders pay for this put option

208 See MICHAEL BELLUCCI & JEROME MCCLUSKEY, THE LSTA’S COMPLETE CREDIT
AGREEMENT GUIDE 339–40 (McGraw-Hill Educ. 2d ed. 2017).
209 See id.
210 See Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, D&O Insurance: A Primer
1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 337, at 337, 366 (2011-2012).
211 Id.
212 Id. at 366. Perhaps the existence of more corporate actors—whose self-interest
works to police contingent creditor claims—explains why tort creditors are less successful
than contract creditors in piercing the corporate veil. See Thompson, supra note 170, at
1039–40, 1058–59.
213 Other corporate actors are unable to do so only in close corporations or within
corporate groups—those places where courts exclusively pierce the corporate veil. See
Thompson, supra note 170, at 1038–39.
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through the terms of the corporate debt, including, but not
limited to, the debt’s interest rate, covenants, and tenor.
In the case of a tort creditor, piercing the corporate veil
similarly prohibits shareholders from using the corporate form to
obtain a free (or discounted) put option from contingent creditors
(including potential tort creditors) with whom the corporation
cannot negotiate ex ante.214 It forces the corporation to internalize
the risks it poses to tort creditors through some sort of
insurance: either through contracting with a third-party insurer or
through self-insurance (i.e., additional equity capital). This
insurance performs the identical function as the ex ante negotiated
purchase of a put option, in effect turning those involuntary
creditors into voluntary creditors.215 This is exactly why share
prices of California corporations did not meaningfully change with
the introduction of limited liability: corporations had already
internalized costs so as to make the value of shareholder indemnity
for corporate torts negligible.216
This understanding, in turn, helps us understand the extent
of the NPV analysis discussed previously in the context of
piercing the corporate veil. The NPV analysis ought to be
performed not at the level of shareholder returns, but rather at
the level of the corporate whole. Shareholders cannot use the
corporate form to shield themselves artificially from liability to
creditors. Said slightly differently, shareholders only risk losing
limited liability by attempting to use the corporate form to make
an otherwise negative NPV project into a positive one through
the externalization of costs onto creditors. Such an action would
without the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil (and unlike the
California firms previously mentioned) result in an artificially
higher share price through the externalization of costs onto
others. Piercing the corporate veil allows creditors to make an
enterprise stand on its own merits, which in turn requires those
culpable shareholders to bear the realized costs of negative NPV
projects.217
214 See David K. Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and
Limits of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L. J. 1305, 1324 (2007).
215 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 107–09.
216 See Weinstein, supra note 20, at 440.
217 This conclusion is analogous to the widely-adopted “Independent Investor” test
which determines the eligibility of employee salary deductions under 26 U.S.C. §
162(a)(1). 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(a)(1) (West). Given that employee salaries are deductible but
shareholders dividends are not, one who is both a shareholder and employee (usually in a
closely-held company) may attempt to disguise a shareholder dividend as an employee
salary in order to avoid incurring tax liability. The “Independent Investor” test guides the
deductibility of employee-shareholder salaries by asking whether an independent thirdparty shareholder would accept the corporate stock’s rate of return given the employee’s
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For this reason, in order for shareholders to avail themselves
fully of limited liability, the corporation’s NPV analysis must
consider and adequately discount the costs not only of actual
creditors, such as debtholders or trade creditors, but also
contingent creditors, which include any potential tort creditor.
Firms internalizing those risks (through more expensive
insurance) will be less incented to engage in excessively risky
activity. Moreover, by internalizing such risk, the corporation no
longer imposes the risk of cost externalization onto involuntary
creditors made possible by corporate undercapitalization.
Finally, this understanding of NPV, which requires that
corporations consider not merely their shareholders, but also
other corporate stakeholders in investment decisions, supports
and augments another theory of the corporation.218 According to
stakeholder welfare theory, in calculating social benefits from
corporate activity, the corporation should not focus merely on
benefits to equity investors, but rather on other stakeholders like
employees, customers, suppliers, and the community.219 A
corporation must, in considering a NPV analysis at the corporate
level, look to maximize corporate welfare because each of these
stakeholders is ultimately either an actual or contingent creditor.
The corporation and its shareholders are free to maximize
profits, but only to the extent that the corporation reasonably
considers and mitigates the risks the corporate form presents to
all stakeholders through undercapitalization.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that tort law would treat
shareholder personal liability under a negligence regime and not
strict liability, and that a negligence regime closely resembles the
current corporate law regime. There are several important
conclusions to draw from this argument, namely, that both
advocates and critics of shareholder strict liability may be
disappointed under a regime of strict shareholder personal
liability. Advocates of limited liability may be disappointed by

deducted salary. See Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 196 F.3d 833,
838–39 (7th Cir. 1999). If so, the deduction is presumptively reasonable. Id. Just as
shareholder-employees are incented to disguise dividends as salaries to avoid tax liability
and increase their ultimate returns, an undercapitalizing shareholder foregoes necessary
insurance premiums in an attempt to do the same. If, when accounting for reasonable
insurance, an independent third-party shareholder would too find the corporate stock’s
rate of return too low, there could similarly be a presumption that a court should pierce
the corporate veil.
218 See STOUT, supra note 65, at 38.
219 See STOUT, supra note 59, at 351.
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the fact that the costs of capital are unlikely to rise substantially.
Corporations can, through their officers and directors, use due
care to prevent undercapitalization, just as the vast majority of
chemical spills by railroads are preventable by due care. If this
statement is true, strict liability should only cause a slight, not
substantial, increase in the cost of capital because the
incremental liability it would create would also be slight.220
Similarly, critics of shareholder limited liability may not find
strict shareholder personal liability to be the panacea they hope
it to be given the only slightly increased incremental liability.
Additionally, expected accident costs may not meaningfully
change (or even increase), resulting in the same (or greater)
incentive to externalize costs under the present regimes of
shareholder limited liability.
This investigation presents two ideas for possible further
areas of research. First, to the extent piercing the corporate veil
differs from an action in negligence, corporate law may
unnecessarily invite unwelcome opportunism through the
current limited liability regime. Second, recall that Hansmann
and Kraakman argue that limited liability is likely a historical
accident. Perhaps there is a historical connection between the
rise of strict liability and limited liability worthy of further study.
The corporate form ultimately benefits society but invites
detrimental opportunism through its potential to externalize
costs. Though at first glance it may be appealing to argue that
shareholders ought to be personally liable for corporate torts
given such potential, corporate law seems to correctly follow tort
law in concluding that shareholders are not strictly personally
liable for corporate torts—negligence applies; that is, the limited
liability regime. Tort law does not justify itself based on finding
the deepest pockets, but rather on asking which liability regime
best addresses the relevant tort. It suggests that negligence, not
strict liability, is the appropriate regime in tort for shareholders
of a corporation. Corporate law correctly follows this intuition.

220 See Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1179–80 (7th
Cir. 1990).

